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Abstract. This article describes how psychological balance theories might be applied to generate 
hypotheses about political events in Cambodia since the Paris Accords of 1991. 
 
One of the most common, popular, and intuitively appealing hypothetical constructs employed to shed 
light on social attitudes and behavior among allies and adversaries is that of balance. By inferring 
homeostatic tendencies of hypothetico-deductive logic for cognitive, emotional, motivational, and 
behavioral dynamics between, within, and among social actors--a biologized categorical imperative, as it 
were--one allegedly can make higher order and well-supported inferences about social phenomena. 
With an armamenterium of related constructs--including dissonance, congruity, and consistency --one 
might make inferences about social actors A, B, and C such as follows: (1) if A and B each support C, they 
are more likely to support each other; (2) if A and C are allies, and B and C are adversaries, A is more 
likely to be an adversary of B; (3) if A and B are adversaries, and B and C are adversaries, then A and C 
are more likely to be allies; (4) if A and B are adversaries, as this adversarial relationship is exacerbated, 
C is viewed as ally or adversary by A and B less for other attributes than those relevant to resolving the 
A-B conflict successfully. 
 
What might this rather facile approach suggest about political events in Cambodia since the 1991 Paris 
Accords, especially the so-called coup recently instituted by Second Prime Minister Hun Sen, the alleged 
implosion among remnants of the Khmer Rouge, the escape to freedom of First Prime Minister 
Norodom Ranariddh? Just one example from the perspective of some Khmer Rouge leaders. 
 
Khmer Rouge forces are becoming militarily and politically marginalized. What to do? Hun Sen and 
Prince Ranariddh are adversaries. By exacerbating this conflict, the Khmer Rouge might induce approach 
behavior towards it by both sides that obviates its role in the death of over one million Cambodians 
between 1975 and 1979. As either side increases its approach behavior, the other side must increase its 
approach behavior even more, exacerbate the conflict even further towards its adversary, or both. 
Approach behavior might involve amnesty or small penalties in return for support in attacking or 
weakening one's adversary. In fact, exacerbating the conflict could well result in weakening both 
adversaries and comparatively strengthening the Khmer Rouge. Even a resolution of the conflict by one 
adversary militarily and politically defeating the other would create the opportunity for the losing side to 
join the Khmer Rouge as allies in a perpetuation of a seemingly intractable conflict. The consequences 
seemingly would be a win-win-win situation. The only threat to such a rosy future would be for the Hun 
Sen and Ranariddh (or royalist) sides to join together as de facto allies, not the putative ones they have 
been from the 1993 elections until recently. Then they could increasingly marginalize or even politically 
and militarily destroy the Khmer Rouge. Khmer Rouge security policy options based on balance theory 
would be evaluated largely in terms of how unlikely this last consequence would be. (A last-gasp Khmer 
Rouge effort based on balance theory might involve inducing a Vietnamese attack on Cambodia, a 
multilateral military intervention by the UN or--even more unlikely--by the countries of the Association 
of Southeast Asian Nations [ASEAN], or the threat of some Third Force--or would that be Fourth Force?) 
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The psychological balance theories have a number of weaknesses that should cause hesitation before 
security specialists trained in the wiles of political psychology hit the playing field. (1) There are so many 
components making up an overall psychological set towards a social actor that it is by no means a simple 
task to identify those towards which balance theories can be applied: attitudes, beliefs, opinions, 
visceral reactions, central amygdala nucleus functioning, memories, various group, interpersonal, 
organizational or field variables? (2) There is the matter of balance within balance theories. There are a 
host of variables that color whether or not, for example, attitudes will correlate with seemingly 
consistent, congruent, or assonant behaviors. (3) And there is the fact that the homogeneity of social 
actors concerning international security Issues is much less--politically and psychologically--than implied 
by psychological balance theories. (a) Politically. In the Cambodian example, Hun Sen was once a Khmer 
Rouge commander, then a prime minister of a Vietnamese-supported Cambodian government, now, 
perhaps, an avatar of Cambodian nationalism or a base will to power. Hun Sen's current supporters 
include thousands of former Khmer Rouge soldiers and some political officials. Ranariddh and his father 
Sihanouk were once allies with the Khmer Rouge and a so-called democratic force against the Hun Sen 
government and have continued through the years to receive support from North Korea and the 
People's Republic of China. Ranariddh himself seems to have problems maintaining support of his 
father. Khmer Rouge leaders, whom the United States Government (USG)--among others--desires to 
defuse, dismantle, and place on trial for war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity, were for 
years politically supported by the USG as part of the legitimate government of Cambodia after the 
Vietnamese invaded the latter in 1979. And, of course, there are and have been many disparate cliques 
and factions within the forces of each of the above, and the simultaneous holding of contradictory 
beliefs, opinions, and feelings within individuals. (b) Psychologically. Psychodynamic, cognitive-
behavioral, and humanistic-existential approaches to personality and social psychology all suggest 
complicating factors variously termed as follows: unconscious, dissociation, asymmetry, extinction, 
desynchrony, state dependent learning, regression, deindividuation, and hidden observers confronting 
the practical value of balance theories. 
 
On balance, balance theories serve as a useful macromolecular vehicle to understand trends, patterns, 
and options. However, as one addresses specific cases or--as some postmodernists might posit--as the 
subjugating truths of balance discourse is objectified, as the cultural discourse of balance is unmasked 
through deconstructive practices, balance becomes unbalanced and subverted. And in the political 
world, as the elite continue their charade of balance, too often others bear the brunt of the 
consequences and fall down. (See Brown, R. (1965.) The principle of consistency in attitude change. In R. 
Brown. Social Psychology. NY: The Free Press, pp. 549-609; Erlanger, S. (July 28, 1997.) Asians are cool to 
Albright on Cambodians and Burmese. The New York Times, p. A3; Kinder, D.R. (1981.) Balance theory 
and political person perception: Asymmetry in beliefs about political leaders. Ann Arbor: University 
Microfilms International; Mydans, S. (July 27, 1997.) Khmer Rouge say Pol Pot is tried and sentenced. 
The New York Times, p. 4Y; Visser, M. (1994.) Policy voting, projection and persuasion: An application of 
balance theory to electoral behavior. Political Psychology, 15, 699-711.) (Keywords: Balance, Cognitive 
Dissonance, Conflict, Congruity, Consistency, Coping, Perception Management, Policy, Praxis, Social 
Cognition.) 
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